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Panel 2: How Are Laws Applied and Detention Practices Reformed?
Litigation: Taking Cases and Those Responsible to Court
Remarks of Steven Watt*

T

hank you and good morning.

I’d like to speak about the
U.S. courts
for victims of the “extraordinary rendition” program,
which, as I will explain, is in effect a program established by the
Bush administration to facilitate forced disappearances and torture and to attempt to evade accountability for these egregious
human rights abuses.
There is no dispute now, that the U.S. is the home of the
“extraordinary rendition” program. This is supported by credible testimony from victims of the program, widespread media
reporting – we’ve even got books on the evolution and operation of the program. There have been criminal investigations
outside the United States into the operations of the CIA in
European nations. And there have been public inquiries in
Europe and Canada into the operation of the program. And,
most importantly, there has been official acknowledgement by
former President Bush and more recently President Obama of
the existence of the detention and interrogation program run by
the United States.
Yet today, despite these admissions and investigations, there
has been no criminal investigation conducted in the United
States into the program’s operation or those persons responsible.
Nor to date has there been any form of effective Congressional
oversight of the program and those persons involved. In the
absence of such criminal investigation and prosecution or effective Congressional oversight, U.S. advocates, including the
ACLU, concerned about the program’s operation, seeking to
bring it to an end, and to secure accountability of those involved
(including redress for many known victims of the program)
have resorted to civil suits in U.S. courts. From this litigation,
it has become apparent, that although on paper, legal mechanisms exist in the U.S. legal system to achieve accountability,
advocates in practice have encountered significant obstacles in
bringing these lawsuits. Today, I want to address in detail one
of those impediments; the so-called “state secrets privilege” and
touch briefly upon another of those obstacles; claims to governmental immunity.
So, just to make sure that we’re all on the same page, what
exactly is the “extraordinary rendition” program? Based upon
the accounts of those that have come out the other end of the
program, there are four common elements to “extraordinary rendition.” First, you have the apprehension of a person – a foreign
national – suspected of involvement in terrorist-related activities, outside the United States. The apprehension is usually carried out by the CIA; the government agency that has taken the

lead in devising and developing the program. The CIA does not
work in isolation but is supported by other government departments as well as local intelligence forces in the country where
the suspect is apprehended. All these operative events take place
outside the United States.
After the suspect is apprehended, they are kidnapped and
secretly transferred to a facility, again, outside the United States,
and which is run by the CIA – so called “black-site” detention facilities – or one run by a foreign government. The third
component, is the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment during the suspects detention and interrogation. And this is the genesis of the “extraordinary rendition” program; to facilitate forced disappearance
and torture without accountability. As the U.S. government has
repeatedly argued in legal pleadings: foreign nationals held outside the United States do not benefit from the protections of the
[U.S.] Constitution and they have no international legal protections which are enforceable before U.S. courts.
The fourth and final component of the program is the release
of the individual from custody or their “warehousing” at a CIA
“black site” facility; at the behest of a foreign government or
alternatively, at Guantánamo.
Separately and taken together, these practices violate a host
of national and international laws. In the United States, there
are a number of laws on the books which allow for criminal
prosecution of torturers and establishing civil liability for those
who participate in egregious human rights violations, including forced disappearance and torture. In the criminal context,
you have a specific act of Congress that’s called the Overseas
Torture Act (§ 2340) which allows for the criminal prosecution
of U.S. officials who engage in torture overseas. This act permits prosecution of those officials who not only directly engage
in torture but also those who conspire in torture. So you can see
how this would allow for the prosecution of officials involved in
extraordinary rendition: The U.S. has an agreement with another
country such as, for example, Egypt, where the use of torture is
routine, to detain and interrogate a person
The War Crimes Act – as amended by the Military Com
missions Act – also criminalizes certain “grave breaches” of the
Geneva Conventions including those who torture or are complicit in the practice.
U.S laws also provide for torturers to be held civilly liable.
The first of those laws, dates back to 1789, the Alien Tort
Claims Act. This Act allows aliens – not U.S. citizens – to sue
for certain violations of customary international and treatybased law including the prohibitions on forced disappearance
and torture. As interpreted by U.S. courts, the ATCA permits
both individuals and corporate entities to be defendants and
establishes liability not only for those persons who are directly

right to a remedy and access to justice in
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lower courts in the United States – without exception – have
repeatedly declined to recognize that victims of U.S. rendition,
detention, and torture policies have a right to civil redress in
U.S. courts for their injuries. These courts have done so in one
of two ways: they’ve either dismissed those claims from the
very outset, without consideration of the merits of the victims’
claims, on the basis of the so-called “state secrets privilege.”
Or, they’ve upheld government claims to official immunity for
their actions without consideration of evidence verifying the
nature and extent of the torture victims’ claims, including official documents from the United States government proving that
techniques were employed that constitute torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment and that these techniques were
employed as a matter of policy.
U.S. courts have held that even if the U.S. does indeed forcibly disappear persons or torture them as a matter of policy,
victims of these policies have no remedy in the courts of the
United States.
Let me illustrate how this has worked in practice by reference to two cases in which I’ve been involved on behalf of
seven victims of the extraordinary rendition program: El-Masri
vs. Tenet and Mohammed v. Jeppesen. In the time remaining, I’ll
touch on the immunity issues.
Turning to the factual background of the El-Masri case.
At the end of 2003, as Khalid El-Masri, a German citizen of
Lebanese decent, was crossing the border between Serbia and
Macedonia, he was apprehended by officials at the border
and thereafter detained for twenty-three days by agents of the
Macedonian intelligence. While detained, he was interrogated
about his alleged associations with Islamic fundamentalist
groups in his home country, Germany. After twenty-three days
of such questioning, El-Masri is handed over to a CIA “black
rendition team”; he’s stripped, he’s beaten, he’s drugged, and
he’s chained spread-eagled to the floor of a plane before being
flown to Afghanistan and held in a secret over-seas prison run
by the CIA. There, he is held for over five months. Shortly after
his transfer to Afghanistan media reports suggest that senior
officials within the United States government were made aware
that they were holding an innocent man in a secret over-seas
prison. Orders were given for his release but he languishes under
horrendous conditions until his release months later. Rather than
being released back to his home in Germany El Masri is flown
to Albania and unceremoniously dumped on a hilltop in the dead
of night to make his own way home to Germany. Following his
return, much, if not all of his story, has subsequently been corroborated by independent evidence, including testimony from
U.S. officials, and evidence uncovered in a German criminal
investigation and Parliamentary inquiry into his case.
In December of 2005, we, the ACLU, filed a civil case on
Khalid El-Masri’s behalf. We filed suit under the Constitution
and under the Alien Tort Claims Act. We named George Tenet,
head of the CIA at the time Khalid El-Masri was rendered as
a defendant and three U.S.-based aviation corporations, which
facilitated the rendition. Flight records we obtained showed that
these aviation corporations either owned or operated the aircraft
used by the CIA in El-Masri’s rendition. We also alleged that
these corporations knew or reasonably should have been aware
that they were complicit in El-Masri’s torture. Shortly after filing suit, the United States government sought to intervene in

involved in these violations but also those that are complicit in
them, including those who aid and abet or conspire in violations
of international human rights law.
The second piece of legislation, is the Torture Victim
Protection Act. This Act allows both U.S. citizens and nonU.S. citizens to sue for summary execution and for torture. But
there’s a wrinkle in this piece of legislation because it only
permits suit against defendants who commit torture under “color
of foreign law.” The Torture Victim Protection Act allows civil
suits against not only those directly responsible for torture but
also those defendants who conspire to commit or aid and abet
torture under color of foreign law.
The TVPA, for example, was used to seek civil accountability of those U.S. officials involved in the “extraordinary rendition” of Maher Arar. Maher Arar was rendered by U.S. officials
from the United States to Syria with the express intention that
he be detained and interrogated under torture there. Maher’s torture, therefore, was committed by U.S. officials under color of
Syrian law as the officials involved in the process of transferring
him to the custody of Syria knew – and indeed intended – that
he be subjected to torture.
The U.S. Constitution also prohibits torture and allows for
civil liability for those officials involved in the practice. Unlike
the Bush administration’s view, our position is that those pro
tections are afforded to U.S. and non-U.S. citizens alike, whenever and wherever they are held by U.S. officials; in other words
there are no restrictions on the protections afforded by the U.S.
constitution.
Finally in 1998, Congress enacted the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act, which domestically incorporates
U.S. obligations under Article 3 of CAT and makes it the policy
of the United States not to send a person to a country where
there is a substantial likelihood of torture. The Act directs government departments to implement regulations to give effect to
this policy statement and both the Department of Justice and
Department of State have done so.
There are a number of international laws binding on the
United States which prohibit extraordinary rendition: the ICCPR
and the Convention against Torture, being the most obvious
ones. However, the U.S. entered a certain reservation to these
treaties – they are so-called “non-self executing” provisions,
which impose restrictions on an individual’s right to directly
enforce these treaty protections in U.S. courts. That being said,
these provisions also form a part of customary international law,
which forms part of the law of the United States and is binding
on it.
These civil laws have formed the basis of three civil suits
filed in U.S. courts seeking to challenge the operation of the
extraordinary rendition program and to hold accountable those
individuals – as well as the corporate entities – responsible. To
begin on a positive note, U.S. advocates have not been altogether unsuccessful in using U.S courts to challenge some of
the worst counter-terrorism policies and practices employed by
the Bush administration. Many of you’ll be aware that in a series
of cases, the Supreme Court struck down the former executive’s effort to detain foreign nationals at Guantánamo indefinitely without review and to try Guantánamo prisoners before
Bush-created military commissions. But these cases, as you’ll
note, all concern U.S. detention policies. To date, however,
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are prepared to accept, carte blanche, government assertions of
national security, even where the allegations against the government are its involvement in egregious human rights violations
such as forced disappearance and torture, and even when those
allegations are corroborated by reliable, official, and publicly
available sources.
In Jeppesen, we sued Jeppesen DataPlan, a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Boeing aerospace company. Jane Mayer – who
is here today – initially identified Jeppesen’s involvement in the
“extraordinary rendition” program, by reporting a conversation
she had with an unnamed former employee of Jeppesen, who
had been in company meetings where senior officials openly
discussed the corporations involvement in the CIA “torture
flights.” Based on this and other evidence linking Jeppesen to
the rendition of our five clients, we sued the company for knowingly assisting the CIA in the forcible disappearance and torture
of our five clients. Specifically, our publicly available evidence
showed that Jeppesen provided crucial flight and logistical support services to aircraft used by the CIA in the rendition of the
five men.
All of the men are non-U.S. citizens and all were rendered
to detention and interrogation in CIA “black-site” detention
facilities or by foreign governments. Jeppesen is the only named
defendant in the case, which is brought under the Alien Tort
Claims Act. Just as in the El-Masri case, even before discovery,
the United States sought to intervene in the litigation to seek
dismissal of the case from the very outset. The lower court,
simply accepted the government’s assertion of harm to national
security interests, ignored publicly available evidence pointing
to Jeppesen’s involvement and dismissed the case. We appealed
the case to the Ninth Circuit and were hopeful that the newly
installed Obama administration would adopt a more reasonable approach in the litigation with regard to assertion of the
privilege.
Obama immediately on taking office promised greater
transparency and openness in government. However, during the
hearing on the appeal, government lawyers expressly adopted
the same position on state secrets as the Bush administration,
to seek immediate dismissal of the case. The judges seemed
slightly incredulous, by the stance of the government and from
their pointed questioning of the government suggested they may
be open to the possibility of a remand to the lower court to have
the state secrets privilege invoked as it should be, not to have
a litigation dismissed from the outset, but rather in a more discrete way over any evidence that may compromise U.S. national
security interests.
What is apparent from these two cases is that the Bush
administration and now the Obama administration is using the
state secrets privilege not as it was initially crafted, as a shield to
protect sensitive national security interests, but rather as a sword
to cover up mistakes, embarrassment, and worse still, egregious
human rights violations. And, U.S. courts, by simply accepting these claims without further searching inquiry, are turning
a blind eye to publicly available evidence and facilitating a
government cover-up. The whole world now knows the fundamental facts of these cases, yet the victims of the “extraordinary
rendition” program have been denied their day in a U.S. court
to have their claims adjudicated. What the state secrets privilege
has morphed into is a form of governmental immunity. HRB

the litigation to invoke the state secrets privilege and to have
the case immediately dismissed with no consideration of the
evidence.
Very briefly, the states secrets privilege is a common law
evidentiary privilege. It has no Constitutional basis. Properly
invoked, it can be used by the government to exclude discrete
pieces of evidence in any case where consideration of that
evidence in court would be harmful to the country’s national
security. When we talk about national security in this context,
we refer to means and methods of interrogation gathering and
U.S. relations with other foreign powers.
The privilege has been recognized by the Supreme Court
since 1954 and the Supreme Court in turn developed it from
an analogous common law evidentiary privilege recognized
under the English common law, Crown Privilege. In support of
its position that litigation of El Masri’s case would be harmful
to national security, the government produced two affidavits;
that was the extent of the “evidence” they produced for the
court substantiating dismissal from the very outset. Both were
produced by the former director of the CIA, Porter Goss; one
was made public and the other for the judge’s eyes only so we
weren’t privy to that one and have no idea what case the gov
ernment made for outright dismissal of the litigation.
Following the court’s consideration of the government’s
affidavits and extensive submissions that we made; and a brief
oral argument, the court upheld the government’s state secrets
claim, finding that the very subject matter of the litigation – the
United States’ operation of a rendition, detention and interrogation program was a state secret and that there were no procedures available to U.S. courts that would adequately protect
its national security interests, while at the same time allowing
Khalid El-Masri his day in court. As an alternative to dismissal,
we had argued that the court had mechanisms at its disposal that
could accommodate those competing interests. For example,
we suggested that there be closed hearings; not the best but its
better than throwing it out of court from the very beginning.
We also suggested appointment of a Special Master or entering
Protective Orders – all mechanisms that U.S. courts routinely
employ and in fact have employed in post-9/11 litigation,
including Guantánamo habeas litigation where national security
issues arise all the time.
The court, however, found none of these alternatives to
dismissal appropriate and effectively ignored all the publicly
available and very reliable information substantiating most of
Khalid’s testimony, and admissions from the Bush administration that it did indeed operate a rendition, detention and interrogation program. The court upheld the government’s claim to
national security and dismissed the case from the very outset.
The decision from the lower court was upheld by the court
of appeals on arguably broader grounds. The court of appeals
found that there was a constitutional basis for the government’s
assertion of the state secrets privilege; it wasn’t just evidentiary
in nature. The end of the road domestically for Khalid came
in October 2007 when the Supreme Court, without comment,
declined to even review the court of appeals’ decision.
From the El Masri case and another challenge to the
“extraordinary rendition” program that we filed in October 2007
on the behalf of five other victims of the extraordinary rendition program, Mohamed v. Jeppesen, it’s clear that U.S. courts
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